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Abstract 
We provide cross country evidence from microfinance institutions (MFIs) that are 
Sharia-compliant and their comparisons with non-Sharia-compliant MFIs. We find that, 
compared with non-Sharia-compliant conventional MFIs, Sharia-compliant Islamic MFIs 
have less credit risk but are less profitable and financially sustainable, have better poverty 
outreach, and are less likely to ‘mission drift’. Our results highlight the differences in religiosity 
and security design between these two institutions. Our study also helps practitioners and 
investors improve the understanding of the difference between conventional and Islamic MFIs. 
The regulatory support for the development of Islamic MFIs is a feasible way to improve 
income of all poor Muslims. 
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Microfinance institutions (hereafter MFIs) have been recognised as an effective 
development tool and even as one of the main innovations in the past 25 years (Servin, Lensink, 
and Van den Berg, 2012; Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland, 2013). However, MFIs face some 
difficulties in penetrating regions with substantial Muslim populations, since conventional 
microfinance is not compatible with the financial principles in Sharia (Islamic law) (Karim, 
Tarazi, and Reille, 2008). A study conducted by the World Bank shows that over 30% of 
interviewed poor people from Jordan, Syria and Indonesia consider religious reasons the largest 
obstacle to microfinance. Consequently, a great demand for financing among the Muslim poor 
remains unmet.  
Despite the high demand for and increasing popularity of Islamic microfinance 
institutions (Islamic MFIs) since the last decade, little is known about this type of financial 
institution. In this paper, we aim to investigate the financial and social performance of Islamic 
MFIs, in comparison with conventional MFIs. We conjecture that the Sharia compliance 
feature can help to mitigate the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers for 
Islamic MFIs because of the role of religiosity and their special product design.  
First, both lenders and borrowers of Islamic MFIs should not conduct any unethical 
behaviours to violate the guidance of Sharia law, whereas conventional MFIs have no such 
restriction. The religiosity could effectively reduce information asymmetry, as found in 
literature that religiosity promotes ethical attitudes (Terpstra, Rozell, and Robinson, 1973; 
Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Brammer, Williams, and Zinkin, 2007). Believers in God may be 
less willing to act unethically since they believe that an omniscient Goss will ‘catch’ them in 
the action or know their unethical thoughts or attitudes. The previous literature finds that firms 
in religious areas or countries are less likely to engage in financial reporting irregularities and 
to experience stock price crash, so they have reduced auditing prices, higher credit ratings and 
lower debt costs (McGuire, Omer, and Sharp, 2011; Callen and Fang, 2015; Kanagaretnam, 
Lobo, and Wang, 2015; Leventis, Dedoulis, and Abdelsalam, 2015; Jiang, John, Li, and Qian, 
2016). Baele, Farooq and Ongena (2014) find that borrowers tend to default on their 
conventional rather than on their Islamic loans, and Islamic loans are less likely to default 
during Ramadan, a period of greater religious orientation. 
Second, the product designs of the two institutions are different. Muslims are prohibited 
from taking or providing riba, which refers to interest or any predetermined return on a loan. 
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The prohibition of riba is generally regarded as a part of Islam’s general vision of a moral 
economy1. Hence, Islamic MFIs should comply with Sharia law, which prohibits the charging 
of interest, requires assets back up and promotes profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) schemes. This 
requirement leads to the main differences between the two types of financial institutions in the 
product designs, where Islamic MFIs tend to have equity-like products while conventional 
MFIs tend to have debt-like products. The equity-like and risk-sharing nature of Sharia-
compliant financial products could induce Islamic MFIs to have strong incentives to participate 
in and monitor the entrepreneurs’ projects and may hence reduce the information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers and adverse selection cost. On the other hand, investment 
depositors of Islamic MFIs may also have more incentives to exercise tight oversight and 
discipline over the Islamic MFI management, since they need to share the risks (and normally 
do not have deposit insurance) (Čihák and Hesse, 2010). By risk-sharing, Islamic MFIs also 
reduce the debt risk-shifting effect documented in Karim (2001), Iqbal and Llewellyn (2002) 
and Obid and Naysary (2014).  
Many Islamic MFIs use leasing contracts to get around the prohibition of making return 
on lending, which are also Sharia-compliant. By way of these leasing contracts, Islamic MFIs 
keep the ownership of the investment goods and rent them for a fee. As argued in Eisfeidt and 
Rampini (2009), in most legal environments, it would be easier for the lessor to regain control 
of the leased assets than it is for a lender who takes a security interest in an asset to repossess 
it. The higher ability to repossess the assets gives the Islamic MFIs an extra cushion for credit 
risk. While it is argued that although the separation of ownership and control in a leasing 
contract increases the agency costs from the borrower side (Eisfeidt and Rampini, 2009), it 
reduces the information asymmetry between the lender (Islamic MFIs) and the borrower from 
the lender’s perspective.  
Hence, if our conjecture that Islamic MFIs have lower information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers than conventional MFIs is true, we should predict that, compared with 
conventional MFIs, Islamic MFIs should be less profitable and financially self-sufficient, and 
have lower credit risk due to the costs associated with the Sharia-compliant products, have 
                                                 
1 This principle could be traced back to the common medieval Arabic practice of doubling the debt if the loan has 
not been repaid when it is due. This practice in its extreme form had resulted in slavery medieval Arabia due to 
the lack of bankruptcy legislation that protects the borrower from failed ventures.  
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better poverty outreach and are less likely to have ‘mission drift’, where financial sustainability 
is attained by sacrificing poverty outreach.  
We employ data from the Microfinance Information Exchange Network, an 
international microfinance platform that provides data on individual MFIs. We construct a 
panel dataset that comprises 316 MFIs located in 12 countries within three regions, namely 
South Asia (SA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(EECA) during the period of 1998 to 2014. A large percentage of the poor in these three regions 
are practicing Muslims. We manually classify MFIs in the MIX Market as Islamic MFIs if 
these MFIs partly or fully provide Islamic microcredit products and services and classify the 
remaining MFIs as conventional MFIs. We find Islamic MFIs have lower credit risk, but lower 
profitability and lower self-sufficiency, higher poverty outreach, and are less likely to ‘mission 
drift’ than conventional MFIs. Our result holds when we employ propensity score matching 
(PSM) method. 
Our paper extends the literature comparing Islamic and conventional bank/finance 
(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi, 2013; Gheeraert, 2014; Mallin, 
Farag, and Ow-Yong, 2014), and those on financial institutions and mutual funds (Abdelsalam, 
Fethi, and Matallin, 2014; Obid and Naysary, 2014; El-Ouadghiri and Peillex, 2018; Yanikkaya, 
Gumus, and Pabuccu, 2018; Alzahrani, 2019). Our paper highlights the important features of 
Islamic MFIs on both religiosity and product design, i.e., equity-like and leasing-like Sharia-
compliant products. We not only compare financial performance (profitability, financial self-
sustainability and credit risk) between Islamic and conventional MFIs, but also study their 
differences in poverty outreach and the tendency of “mission drift”, which are special features 
of MFIs.  
Our research also extends and complements the current literature on microfinance. 
Extant literature has analysed microfinance’s characteristics, such as capital structure, 
ownership and female leadership (Tchuigoua, 2015; Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland, 2014), 
cost efficiency (Caudill, Gropper, and Hartarska, 2009), financial performance (Mersland and 
Strøm, 2009; Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland, 2013; Islam, Nguyen, and Smyth, 2015), 
sustainability (Bogan, 2012) and technical efficiency (Derigs and Marzban, 2009; Servin, 
Lensink, and Van den Berg, 2012). As the only study examining the impact of religion on 
microfinance, the evidence of Mersland, D’Espallier, and Supphellen (2013) shows that 
compared with conventional MFIs, Christian MFIs have lower funding costs, lower 
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profitability and similar credit risk. Our study sheds light on the impact of Islam, enshrined by 
a quarter of the world’s population, on microfinance.  
Our study is important and valuable to practitioners and investors related to MFIs. Our 
study helps them develop a comprehensive understanding of the difference between 
conventional and Islamic MFIs. This understanding could guide practitioners to take effective 
actions, such as generating strategies or other Sharia-compliant financial products to reduce 
operational costs. Therefore, in the real world, Islamic MFIs could increase their profitability 
and ability to sustain operations with no subsidies. Our study also has implications for policy 
makers in the Muslim world. Our evidence that Islamic MFIs have a better reach to the poor 
suggests that the regulatory support2 for the development of Islamic MFIs is a feasible way to 
improve income of all poor Muslims. For instance, in 1997, the Yemen government, along with 
the United Nations, initiates the Hodeidah Microfinance Program, which aims to apply the 
Islamic financial principles to the microfinance sector (Ahmed and Grace, 2001). 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 overviews the Sharia-compliant products 
provided by MFIs. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature and develops our hypotheses. 
Section 4 discusses the data selection, measures and summary statistics. Section 5 displays the 
main results and their interpretations. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Sharia-compliant products in MFIs 
Most Islamic MFIs only offer two financial products: Murabaha and Qard-Hassan 
loans (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi, 2013). Under Murabaha financing, the financial institution buys 
an asset on behalf of the entrepreneur. The financial institution then resells this asset to the 
entrepreneur at a predetermined price that includes the original cost and an added profit margin. 
The entrepreneur makes payment to the financial institution in lump sum or in instalments in 
the future. The financial institution transfers the ownership to the entrepreneur when all 
payments are made. Murabaha financing is the classical and most widely offered instrument 
for trade financing. Qard-Hassan loans, translated as “beautiful loans” or “benevolent loan”, 
is a type of loans in Islamic banking without any interest, although borrowers can pay back 
extra money as thanks.  
                                                 
2 Regulatory support for Islamic MFIs in particular countries is shown in Appendix B.  
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As a ‘cost plus mark-up’ sale contract, Murabaha is employed to finance goods and 
services needed as working capital. The mark-up is distinct from interest since it remains fixed, 
even if the repayment is overdue. Murabaha is the most popular and largest Islamic 
microfinance product, with the broadest outreach. Since Murabaha is tied to a particular asset, 
such as property, plant and equipment, it is less flexible than the commutable loan payment 
provided by conventional MFIs. Further, managing the transfer of assets of Islamic MFIs 
creates much higher operational costs than managing the cash distribution of conventional 
MFIs. Not tied to assets, Qard-Hassan loans are comparably easy to administer, so these loans 
have become the second largest Islamic microfinance product after Murabaha. But they are 
often not priced to cover their administrative costs (such charges are not permitted) and default 
costs.  
As to another two Islamic financial products, Musharaka and Mudaraba, underlying 
profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) schemes, are mostly encouraged by Sharia but are rarely offered 
by Islamic MFIs. Musharaka and Mudaraba require Islamic MFIs to share profits or losses 
with both investors and entrepreneurs. Specifically, under Mudarabah financing, the financial 
institution provides capital and the entrepreneur contributes effort and exercise by entirely 
controlling the business. If the business suffers a loss, the financial institution obtains no or a 
negative return on its investment and the entrepreneur earns no compensation for his/her effort. 
If the business generates a gain, the profits are split based on a pre-negotiated equity percentage.  
Under Musharaka financing, the financial institution and the entrepreneur jointly 
supply the capital and manage the business. Losses are absorbed based on the proportion of 
capital contribution, while profit proportions are negotiated freely. These two instruments are 
similar to equity investments: Mudarabah financing is closer to a limited partnership and 
Musharaka financing is closer to an equity stake with controlling rights. These two products 
specifically require prudent reporting and high-level transparency to ensure that profits and 
losses are distributed fairly. Consequently, these two products result in tremendous operational 
costs in scrutiny, particularly for micro and small enterprises that are not used to formal 
accounting. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Compared with conventional MFIs, Islamic MFIs comply with Sharia law, which 
prohibits the charging of interest and promotes profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) schemes and 
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leasing-like product. Consequently, conventional MFIs and Islamic MFIs reveal different 
business models and mission orientations, which might influence their corresponding financial 
and social performance. However, the extant literature remains unclear about the differences 
in financial performance, credit risk and social performance between conventional and Islamic 
MFIs. We formulate our hypotheses in this section. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses on financial performance 
While the costs of capital for both conventional and Islamic MFIs are relatively low, 
the costs of capital for Islamic MFIs should be lower than those for conventional MFIs. First, 
although conventional MFIs receive subsides in the form of voluntary donations, these subsides, 
conditional on economic conditions, are quite unstable. Islamic charity, such as Zakat 
(obligatory alms tax), Sadaqah (voluntary donation) and Waqf (perpetual trust endowment), is 
an exclusive source of financing for Islamic MFIs. Zakat is considered as a reliable source of 
massive interest-free funds since Muslims compulsorily replenish it annually. El-Zoghbi and 
Tarazi (2013) reports that almost half of Islamic MFIs rely on Zakat to finance some parts of 
their operations. Second, conventional MFIs receive subsidized debts and equities, which are 
below the market rates, from aid agencies and financial markets respectively (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2011; Hudon and Traca, 2011). Banned to the charge of interest by Sharia, Islamic 
MFIs receive subsidized Qard-Hassan loans, which are interest-free, from financial markets. 
According to El-Zoghbi and Tarazi (2013), one third of Islamic MFIs sole rely on Qard-Hassan 
loans as the source of financing. 
Islamic MFIs face less information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers than 
conventional MFIs, due to the role of religiosity and their product design. Firstly, both lenders 
and borrowers of Islamic MFIs prefer not to take unethical actions, which violate Sharia law, 
but those of conventional MFIs do not face this pressure. Most prior literature shows that 
religiosity could effectively prevent unethical actions, such as financial reporting irregularities, 
and then reduce information asymmetry, such as lower auditing prices, higher credit ratings 
and lower debt costs (McGuire, Omer, and Sharp, 2011; Callen and Fang, 2015; Kanagaretnam, 
Lobo, and Wang, 2015; Leventis, Dedoulis, and Abdelsalam, 2015; Jiang, John, Li, and Qian, 
2016). According to Baele, Farooq and Ongena (2014), borrowers tend to default on their 
conventional rather than on their Islamic loans. Secondly, compared with the debt-like nature 
of conventional financial products, the equity-like and risk-sharing nature of Sharia-compliant 
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financial products create stronger incentives for Islamic MFIs to participate in and monitor the 
entrepreneurs’ projects, and for investment depositors of Islamic MFIs to exercise extensive 
oversight and discipline over the Islamic MFI management. As a result, the information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers is effectively reduced.  
Since Islamic MFIs may have relatively lower cost of capital and lower information 
asymmetry, we hypothesise that: 
H1a: Islamic MFIs are more profitable and sustainable than conventional MFIs 
 
One the other hand, since most Islamic financial products are tied to tangible assets, the 
operational costs of Islamic MFIs are expected to be higher than conventional MFIs. Managing 
the transfer of assets involved in financial products creates much higher operational costs than 
managing the cash distribution used in conventional MFIs. Islamic MFIs’ financial products 
under PLS schemes require prudent reporting and high-level transparency to ensure that profits 
and losses are distributed fairly, further increasing the operational costs in scrutiny. This 
requirement is particularly costly for micro and small firms that are not accustomed to formal 
accounting. Although not tied to assets, Qard-Hassan loans are often not priced to cover their 
administrative costs (such charges are permitted) and default costs.  
In Islamic contracting, gharar (uncertainty and risk) is not allowed in order to prevent 
the weak from being exploited or one gaining at the expense of another. According to Abedifar, 
Molyneux, and Tarazi (2013) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche (2013), the prices of 
Islamic financial products are much lower than conventional ones. Conventional MFIs usually 
charge their financial products nominal interest rates up to 60%, and even higher interest rates 
when repayment is overdue as a penalty (Dehejia, Montgomery, and Morduch, 2012). However, 
for the two main Islamic MFI products, Murabaha only charges a fixed mark-up with no 
penalty for overdue repayment and Qard-Hassan loans do not charge any fees. Mark-up is 
based on the prevailing interest rates used by the non-Muslim world, such as London Interbank 
Offered Rates (LIBOR) or Base Lending Rate (BLR). Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi (2013) 
document that Islamic finance does not extract rents (higher loan or lower deposit rates) for 
providing Islamic financial products. According to Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche 
(2013), Islamic finance does not charge higher fees and commissions to compensate for the 
lack of interest revenue.  
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Finally, Muslims are prohibited to invest in non-halal related businesses or conduct 
certain businesses, such as sale of pork, alcohol and tobacco, gambling and weapons. In 
addition, Shariah principle also requires that the commodity to be sold must exist, so 
derivatives, such as futures and options, are prohibited. These prohibited financial activities 
and products are known to be more profitable but riskier.  
Since Islamic MFIs may have higher operational costs and lower price charges for their 
products and services, and have more restrictions on the business product ranges than 
conventional MFIs, we hypothesise that: 
H1b: Islamic MFIs are less profitable and sustainable than conventional MFIs 
 
3.2 Hypotheses on risk 
The religious belief of Islamic MFI clients might induce loyalty and stem default 
(Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi, 2013; Baele, Farooq, and Ongena, 2014), and thus reduces 
the credit risk of Islamic MFIs. For borrowers of Islamic MFIs, taking out Islamic loans means 
conducting economic activity encouraged by Sharia (i.e. ‘putting your money where your 
mouth is’). It is unlikely that Muslims take out Islamic loans to conduct arbitrary activities, 
because Sharia prohibits the misappropriation of other people’s property (i.e. ‘eating other 
people’s money in an unlawful way’). Thus, Muslim borrowers have a higher propensity to 
fulfil their obligations under Islamic loan contracts, leading to lower default risk. Additionally, 
the extant literature reveals a positive relation between religiosity and an individual’s risk 
aversion (Hilary and Hui, 2009; Shu, Sulaeman,, and Yeung, 2012; Abedifar, Molyneux, and 
Tarazi, 2013; Adhikari and Agrawal,  2016; Jiang, John, Li, and Qian, 2016).  
Equity-like and risk-sharing nature of Islamic financial products could also suppress 
the default risk. First, Islamic MFIs could effectively control the project risk during the ongoing 
process, since their role changes from project monitor to project participant. For instance, under 
the Mudaraba contract, while the entrepreneurs have the ultimate control over their businesses, 
major investment decisions, containing the participation of other investors, have to be approved 
by Islamic institutions (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche, 2013). Second, investment 
depositors of Islamic MFIs also have more incentives to exercise tight oversight and discipline 
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over the Islamic MFI management, since they need to share in the risks (and normally do not 
have deposit insurance) (Čihák and Hesse, 2010).3 
Various Sharia-compliant Islamic MFIs employ leasing contract to get around the 
forbidden of obtaining return on lending. Under these leasing contracts, Islamic MFIs maintain 
the ownership of the investment goods and lease it for a commission. According to Eisfeidt 
and Rampini (2009), in most legal environments, compared with a lender who takes an interest 
in an asset, a lesser is easier to regain control of the assets, because he/she has the ownership 
of the asset. This ability endows the Islamic MFIs an extra cushion for credit risk. Although 
the separation of ownership and control in a leasing contract raises the agency costs from the 
borrower side (Eisfeidt and Rampini, 2009), it lessens the lend-borrower information 
asymmetry.  
Based on users’ religious belief, religious attitude toward risk, and equity-like and risk-
sharing nature of Islamic financial products, as well as leasing-like products, we hypothesise 
that:  
H2a: Islamic MFIs have lower credit risk than conventional MFIs 
 
On the other hand, Islamic MFIs might have a higher credit risk than conventional MFIs, 
due to the nature of their product designs. Compared with conventional loan contracts, Islamic 
loan contracts (Murabaha), the largest Islamic microfinance product, are more complex 
because they involve purchase and resale of products. This characteristic exposes Islamic MFIs 
to credit risk due to the fluctuation of commodity prices and the ownership transfer at the end 
of the repayment period. For instance, under a Murabaha contract, an Islamic MFI buys a house 
on behalf of a family at $50,000 and the family needs to repay $500 per month for ten years 
($60,000 in total; mark-up = 20% of the principal). At the beginning of the second year, the 
price of the house might drop to $40,000. In this case, if the family defaults on this contract 
and initiates a new one, the total cost would be $54,000 ($500*12 + $40,000 + $40,000*0.2), 
lower than the cost of the original one.  
                                                 
3 Idiosyncratic risk of Islamic MFIs, however, may be higher than conventional MFIs because equity-like nature 
of Islamic financial products may expose Islamic MFIs to the fluctuation of commodity prices, and the absent or 
fixed default penalty linked to Islamic MFIs’ products may lead to increased losses given default. In addition, 




Islamic MFIs usually do not charge a penalty for default, since a default penalty is not 
compliant with Sharia. In some cases, Islamic MFIs might use rebate to replace default penalty. 
The mark-up attached to the partnership loans (Murabaha) implicitly include both the return 
and a default penalty component of the Islamic MFIs. If the borrower repays the loan in a 
timely manner, then he/she will obtain the rebate. Thus, Islamic MFIs collect the delayed 
penalty over the whole financing period, while conventional MFIs calculate default interest 
payments over the delayed period (Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi, 2013). The absent or fixed 
default penalty associated with Islamic MFIs is quite limited compared to the crescent default 
interest payments of conventional MFIs, resulting in increased credit risk for Islamic MFIs.  
Base on the differences in the complexity of conventional and Islamic products and in 
default penalty of conventional and Islamic products, we hypothesise that:  
H2b: Islamic MFIs have higher credit risk than conventional MFIs 
 
3.3 Hypotheses on outreach and mission drift 
Poverty outreach includes breadth and depth; this is seen specifically in Islamic MFIs 
as number of clients in a given period and the extent of penetration to the poorest at the 
beginning of the period, respectively. Scholars consider breadth of outreach as a measure of 
microfinance quantity, and depth of outreach as a measure of microfinance quality. Recently, 
a group of scholars has noticed a phenomenon called ‘mission drift’, in which financial 
sustainability is attained by sacrificing poverty outreach (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 
2007; Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters, 2011). In other words, MFIs may have shifted their 
orientation from social mission (outreach) fulfilment to profit generation. This is because the 
unit transaction costs in terms of screening, monitoring and administration costs linked to 
smaller loans are higher than those linked to larger loans. Nobel Peace Prize winner 
Muhammad Yunus has said that clients who are financially better off crowd out poorer clients 
in any credit scheme.   
The distinction in the company culture and business model of conventional and Islamic 
MFIs might differentiate their performance in serving the poor and sticking to the mission. 
Embedded with both ethical and religious responsibility, Islamic MFIs have a stronger 
motivation than conventional MFIs to fulfil their social mission (outreach) and not to drift away. 
Conventional MFIs operate in an environment where maximising capital and wealth are as 
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important as helping the poor, while Islamic MFIs operate in an environment where the equal 
distribution of social welfare is the priority and speculative behaviours are strictly forbidden 
(like ‘mission drift’). Also, Islamic MFIs may have a stronger sense of duty and obligation to 
poor Muslims, who are excluded by banks and financial institutions but are unwilling to accept 
microfinance that is not compliant with Sharia (Karim, Tarazi, and Reille, 2008; Mohieldin, 
Iqbal, Rostom, and Fu, 2011).  
Due to the different price-charge features of their financial products, Islamic MFIs 
might attract more poor customers, particularly the poorest customers, than conventional MFIs. 
According to Dehejia, Montgomery, and Morduch (2012), conventional MFIs often charge 
their financial products very high nominal interest rates of up to 60%, and even higher interest 
rates for overdue repayment as a penalty. Critics of conventional MFIs posit that microfinance 
has driven the poor into a debt trap, in some cases even causing suicide (Sundaresan, 2008; 
Biswas, 2010). Such sky-high interest rates might frighten and inhibit the poor, particularly the 
poorest, who are less capable of repaying loans. In contrast, Islamic finance does not extract 
rents (higher loan rates) (Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi, 2013) and does not charge higher 
fees and commissions to compensate for the lack of interest revenue (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Merrouche, 2013). As such, the poor feel comfortable obtaining loans from Islamic MFIs. 
Compared with conventional MFIs which experience commercialisation or ‘mission 
drift’ to some extent (Navajas, Conning, and Gonzalez‐Vega, 2003; McIntosh, Janvry, and 
Sadoulet, 2005; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2007), Islamic MFIs, which are still in 
their infancy, are less likely to do so. Firstly, Islamic MFIs face no or much less competition 
which might stimulate commercialisation, because the market need for Islamic financial 
products is far more than the market supply for Islamic financial products. Practicing Muslims 
make up a large proportion of the poor around the world, and an estimated 650 million Muslims 
live on less than $2 a day (Obaidullah and Khan, 2008). Secondly, Islamic MFIs are not 
technically and operationally prepared for commercialisation. Financial principles enshrined 
in Sharia limit Islamic MFIs’ capability to sustainably provide Sharia-compliant financial 
products at scale (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi, 2013). One principle is the prohibition on interest, 
which makes the application of a traditional microloan model technically impossible. Another 
principle is the encouragement of wealth generation through equity participation in business 




Based on the differences in attitudes towards economic and social missions, product 
features and development stages between conventional and Islamic MFIs, we hypothesise that: 
H3: Islamic MFIs have better poverty outreach than conventional MFIs 
H4: Islamic MFIs are less likely to experience mission drift than conventional 
MFIs 
 
4 Data, measures and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Data collection and selection 
We collect MFI information from the MIX Market database, a worldwide microfinance 
information platform for MFIs. This database contains information voluntarily reported by 
individual MFIs about their financial statements and balance sheets. Since most of these 
financial statements and balance sheets are audited, this database is considered accurate and 
reliable. However, we should also note that this database does not contain information from all 
MFIs because many MFIs choose not to report to this data platform. We denominate all 
financial variables into US dollars and adjust for country-specific inflation. We identify 316 
MFIs (including 281 conventional MFIs and 35 Islamic MFIs) operating in three regions, 
including South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
over the period of 1998 to 2014. 37% of the poor in these three regions are practicing Muslims. 
After adjusting for missing data, our final sample contains 1,909 firm-year observations.  
We manually classify MFIs in the MIX Market database into two categories, 
conventional or Islamic, in light of the following procedures. We first identify regions with a 
presence of both conventional and Islamic MFIs and remove the remaining regions from the 
database. We then distinguish Islamic MFIs from conventional MFIs in these selected regions. 
Following Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi (2013), we define Islamic MFIs as entities that offer 
Islamic microcredit products and services. Namely, Islamic MFIs are MFIs that fully or 
partially provide Sharia-compliant products or services. Some Islamic MFIs are well known, 
while others are easily identified through their unique names, for example, Muslim Aid 
(Bangladesh), Akhuwat (Pakistan) or BMT (Indonesia). There exists 33 MFIs that only provide 
Sharia-compliant products or services, and 2 MFIs with a separate business branch that 
particularly provide Sharia-compliant products or services in the database. Appendix D 
presents all Islamic MFIs and their locations.  
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4.2 Empirical methods and variables 
We examine the difference between conventional and Islamic MFIs, and our baseline 
regression model is presented below: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + ɛ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where Y represents three groups of dependent variables, which are Financial 
Performance, Credit Risk and Outreach. The variable of primary interest, Islamic MFI, is a 
dummy variable that equals one if an MFI is Islamic, and 0 if it is conventional. Country and 
Year control for both country and year fixed effects.  
Following prior studies, we construct four measures to represent an MFI’s financial 
profitability: 1) Operational Costs; 2) Administrative Costs; 3) Return on Assets (ROA); and 
4) Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS).4 Although not-for-profit organisations employ a wide 
range of measures to represent their cost and profitability, similar to for-profit organisations, 
these four measures are the most widely employed. Market performance measures are not 
applicable since the MFIs in our database are not listed. Operational Costs are defined as the 
operational costs divided by the loan portfolio, and mainly contain wages and administrative 
costs. Administrative Costs are measured as the total administrative costs on the loan portfolio 
divided by the total assets. As the traditional for-profit-maximization measure across different 
institutions, ROA is defined as the ratio of net operating income to total assets. Operational 
Self-Sufficiency (OSS) is defined as total financial revenue divided by the sum of financial 
expense, operating expense and loan loss provision expense. If an MFI’s OSS is above 100%, 
it indicates that this MFI is operationally self-sufficient. If an MFI’s OSS is above 110%, it 
indicates that this MFI is financially self-sufficient (Bogan, 2012). OSS mirror the MFIs’ ability 
to sustain their operations without subsidies, while ROA mirrors the MFIs’ ability to generate 
profits using their assets.  
Following Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and Molinero (2009), Mersland and Strøm 
(2009) and Bogan (2012), we employ three measures of credit risk: 1) Portfolio at 
Risk >90days (PaR>90days); 2) Write-off Ratio; 3) Loan Loss Rate. For lending institutions, 
the default possibility (Portfolio at Risk) is a crucial management measure since non-payments 
result in default losses (Write-off), which might impact their financial feasibility and future 
                                                 
4 These four measures are employed in Mersland and Strøm (2009), Ahlin, Lin, and Maio (2011), Galema, Lensink, 
and Spierdijk (2011), Servin, Lensink, and Van den Berg (2012), Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland (2014), 
Tchuigoua (2015), and Randøy, Strøm, and Mersland (2015). 
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survival. PaR>90days is the percentage of the portfolio that is overdue for more than 90 days. 
Write-off Ratio is the percentage of the total amount of loans written off to gross loan portfolio. 
Loan Loss Rate is the ratio of the difference between write-offs and loans recovered to gross 
loan portfolio. A higher proportion of loan delay, write-off and loss implies higher credit risk.  
Since information on the income or wealth of individual borrowers to measure their 
poverty levels is not available, prior studies tend to use the following two indicators as proxies 
of poverty outreach: 1) Number of Active Borrowers; 2) Average Loan Size to GNI/Capita (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2009; Louis, Seret, and Baesens, 
2013; Roberts, 2013). Number of Active Borrowers reflects the total number of individuals that 
an MFI serves. More active borrowers indicate greater poverty outreach, because, holding the 
total lending constant, the number of borrowers that an MFI can reach is inversely related to 
the number of borrowers. Average Loan Size is the average loan size per borrower divided by 
country group national income per capita. Smaller loans are usually taken by poorer borrowers, 
indicating greater poverty outreach.  
Following Servin, Lensink, and Van den Berg (2012), D'espallier, Goedecke, Hudon, 
and Mersland (2013) and Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland (2014), we control for a battery of 
variables related to firm performance and MFI characteristics. Total Assets, namely total assets, 
and Age, classified as new, young and mature in our case, reflect the competitiveness of an 
MFI. Leverage, debt-to-equity ratio, shows the financial health of an MFI and Total Assets 
Growth shows the expansion speed of an MFI. Portfolio Yield, the interest revenue (or mark-
up and dividend revenue) divided by gross loan portfolio, mirrors an MFI’s loan portfolio scale 
and output. Deposits-to-Assets ratio reflects the importance of deposits in an MFI’s operation. 
Target Market, classified as low-end, high-end, small business and broad, reflects the business 
strategy of an MFI. For Regulated is a dummy variable if an MFI is regulated. Differences in 
legal status reflect different rights and duties in conducting businesses. For Profit is a dummy 
variable if an MFI targets at making profits rather than fulfilling social mission. Disclosure 
Ratings by the MIX Market database range from one to five, which implies the increasing 
disclosure quality. Number of Offices indicates firm competitiveness from a personnel 






4.3 Descriptive statistics 
In Appendix C, we present data on 12 countries with both conventional and Islamic 
MFIs within the regions of South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. These 12 countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria and Yemen (Appendix D). Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for all variables. To minimise the impact of outliers, we winsorize the 
continuous variables at one percentile level. We find that 12.50% of the observations are linked 
to Islamic MFIs and 87.50% of the observations are related to conventional MFIs.  
The last column presents the comparison of conventional and Islamic MFIs in terms of 
the means of all variables. Islamic MFIs exhibit much higher operational costs than 
conventional MFIs. Overall, Islamic MFIs have a negative mean of ROA (-3.316%) while 
conventional MFIs have a positive mean of ROA (0.084%). The median of Islamic MFIs’ ROA 
is 1.100%, suggesting that over half of Islamic MFIs generate profits. This evidence is line 
with our expectation that Islamic MFIs are less profitable and less self-sufficient than 
conventional MFIs. 
The remaining dependent variables, such as administrative costs, OSS, PaR>90, write-
off ratio, loan loss rate, number of active borrowers and average loan size, do not show a 
significant difference between conventional and Islamic MFIs. Both conventional and Islamic 
MFIs’ mean values of OSS are above 110%, indicating that both types of MFIs are on average 
operationally and financially self-sufficient. 
Islamic MFIs are younger and smaller than conventional MFIs. The average total assets 
of both conventional and Islamic MFIs are around $500 million, although Islamic MFIs are 
slightly smaller than conventional MFIs. Both conventional and Islamic MFIs have high 
leverage (no less than 400%), although Islamic MFIs have higher leverage than conventional 
MFIs. Islamic MFIs are less likely to be legally regulated and profit-oriented than conventional 
MFIs. Islamic MFIs have higher deposits-to-assets ratios, and more offices, since they are 
restricted to invest in other assets (such as bonds) by Sharia. Islamic MFIs exhibit lower 
disclosure quality than conventional MFIs because, being relatively smaller and younger, 
Islamic MFIs have not developed qualified financial reporting systems. Differences between 
total assets growth, gross loan portfolio, portfolio yield and target market are insignificant 
between these two kinds of MFIs.  
17 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Financial performance 
Table 2 reports estimates from the baseline regressions. In Columns (1) and (2), Islamic 
MFI is significantly and positively associated with Operational Costs and Administrative Costs 
at the 1% level and 5% level respectively. This evidence reflects the economically significant 
difference between these two costs for the two types of MFIs. For instance, the coefficient of 
Islamic MFI on Operational Costs (0.093) indicates that the operational costs of Islamic MFIs 
are 0.093 higher than those of conventional MFIs, which account for 59% of the average 
operational costs of the total sample (0.157). This result supports our expectation that the 
assets-involved Islamic MFIs’ financial products create higher operational and administrative 
costs. In Columns (3) and (4), Islamic MFI is negatively and significantly related to ROA and 
OSS at the 1% level. The difference in financial performance are also economically significant. 
For instance, the coefficient of Islamic MFI on OSS (-0.098) indicates that Islamic MFIs’ OSS 
is 0.098 lower than that of conventional MFIs, which accounts for 8.60% of the average OSS 
of the total sample (1.140). Our result hence provides evidence to support our hypothesis (H1b) 
that Islamic MFIs are less profitable and less self-sufficient than conventional MFIs. 
In terms of control variables, with the growth of firm size, ROA, operational costs and 
administrative costs are increasing, in line with those reported in Mersland and Strøm (2009), 
D'espallier, Goedecke, Hudon, and Mersland (2013) and Roberts (2013). When MFIs grow 
older, their operational and administrative costs increase accordingly. Portfolio yield is 
positively related to both costs and performance. Write-off ratio could lead to the increase of 
costs and the decrease of profitability and sustainability, in accordance with that reported in 
Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland (2014). Compared with MFIs targeting at broad markets, 
MFIs targeting at low-end markets have higher costs and lower performance, while MFIs 
targeting at small businesses have lower costs and lower performance. Regulating MFIs could 
increase their costs as well as their performance and disclosing ratings could increase both two 
costs. Profit-orientated MFIs tend to have lower administrative costs and MFIs with more 
offices tend to have higher ROA.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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5.2 Credit risk 
Table 3 reports estimates from the baseline regressions. Columns (1) to (3) show that 
Islamic MFI is negatively and significantly associated with PaR>90days, Write-off Ratio and 
Loan Loss Rate at the 5% level. These results are also economically significant. For instance, 
the coefficient of Islamic MFI (-0.017) on PaR>90days indicates that the percentage of loans 
overdue more than 90 days is 0.017 lower than that of conventional MFIs, which accounts for 
35.42% of the average value of the total sample (0.048). In accordance with our hypothesis 
(H2a), our result shows that Islamic MFIs bear a lower credit risk than conventional MFIs. This 
evidence also suggests that although the complexity and penalty-free of Islamic financial 
products could bring about credit risk, religious belief encourages Muslim borrowers to fulfil 
their obligations under Islamic loan contracts and equity-like and risk-sharing nature of Islamic 
financial products increase the controlling and monitoring of borrowers, resulting in overall 
lower credit risk (Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi, 2013; Baele, Farooq, and Ongena, 2014).  
In terms of control variables, larger MFIs overall have higher credit risk. New MFIs 
have more loans that are overdue more than 90 days but have lower write-off ratio. Both 
leverage and total assets growth could increase MFIs’ credit risk. Deposit-to-assets is positively 
related to the percentage of loans that are overdue more than 90 days, while is negatively related 
to the loan loss rate. MFIs, targeting at small business markets, have lower percentage of 
overdue loans. Both regulated and for-profit MFIs have higher loan loss rate. More offices 
increase the percentage of overdue loans. This evidence regarding control variables is 
consistent with that reported in Mersland and Strøm (2009) and D'espallier, Goedecke, Hudon, 
and Mersland (2013). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3  Outreach 
We argue that an MFI has better outreach if it reaches more active borrowers. The 
number of active borrowers not only reflects the breadth of the outreach (how many poor 
people are served), but also the depth of outreach (how poor are the people served), because, 
holding the total lending constant, the poverty level of the borrowers an MFI can reach is 
inversely related with the total number of borrowers. A socially responsible MFI will pursue 
the goal of reaching the poorest people while at the same time serving a large number of 
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borrowers. We also use average loan size as another measure of outreach. Average loan size is 
the average loan size per borrower divided by country group national income per capita. 
Smaller loans are usually taken out by poorer borrowers, indicating greater outreach. 
Column (1) in Table 4 presents that Islamic MFI is positively and significantly linked 
to Ln of Number of Active Borrowers at the 1% level. The economic significance of this 
difference is also sizeable. The coefficient of Islamic MFI (0.191) suggests that Islamic MFIs 
have on average 19.1% more active borrowers than conventional MFIs. Column (2) presents 
that Islamic MFI is negatively and significantly linked to Average Loan Size at the 1% level. 
The economic significance of this difference is also sizeable. The coefficients of Islamic MFI 
(-0.368) suggest that Islamic MFIs have on average 36.8% smaller loan size than conventional 
MFIs. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis (H3) that Islamic MFIs have a better 
poverty outreach than conventional MFIs. However, average loan size may not be a good 
indicator of poverty outreach because it is not necessarily associated with borrower poverty. 
First, institutional characteristics, such as maximum loan size, risk management practices or 
regulatory boundaries of MFIs’ operations, are stronger drivers of an MFI’s average loan size 
than borrower poverty (Christen and Drake, 2002; Dunford, 2002). Second, small loans are not 
predominantly given to very poor borrowers, since less poor borrowers might also be interested 
in more flexible small loans (Christen and Drake, 2002; Dunford, 2002).  
In terms of control variables, large MFIs lend to more active borrowers and increase 
their average loan size. New MFIs have less active borrowers and larger average loan size. 
Total assets growth also reduces the number of active borrowers, while portfolio yield reduces 
average loan size. MFIs targeting at low-end markets have more active borrowers and MFIs 
targeting at high-end markets have less active borrowers. Regulated MFIs have larger average 
loan size, but the condition for for-profit MFIs is reversed. Disclosure ratings indicate more 
active borrowers and smaller average loan size. MFIs with less offices tend to have more active 
borrowers. These results regarding control variables are in line with those reported in 
Tchuigoua (2015). 






5.4 Mission drift 
We finally investigate the difference between conventional and Islamic MFIs with 
regards to mission drift. Our baseline regression is exhibited below: 
𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∗  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
+ ɛ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (2)     
The coefficient of ROA, 𝛽𝛽3, is expected to be negative and significant, meaning that an 
increase in profitability is linked to a decrease in poverty outreach, and hence ‘mission drift’. 
The variable of primary interest is the interaction term Islamic MFI*ROA, which represents the 
difference between Islamic and conventional MFIs in the impact of ROA on outreach. If we 
conjecture that Islamic MFIs are less likely to experience ‘mission drift’, we would expect 𝛽𝛽2 
to be positive and significant, indicating that the negative relationship between ROA and 
outreach is less severe for Islamic MFIs.   
Columns (3) to (4) in Table 4 report the results. Column (3) shows that ROA is 
negatively related to Ln of Number of Active Borrowers at the 5% level. The coefficient of ROA 
(-0.748) suggests that a 1% increase of MFIs’ ROA leads to a 0.75% decrease of number of 
active borrowers. The interaction term Islamic MFI*ROA is positively and significantly related 
to Ln of Number of Active Borrowers at the 1% level. This result suggests that the negative 
relation between ROA and poverty outreach is less obvious for Islamic MFIs, so Islamic MFIs 
are less likely to experience ‘mission drift’ than conventional MFIs. Column (4) shows that 
ROA is positively related to Average Loan Size at the 5% level. The coefficient of ROA (0.631) 
suggests that a 1% increase in MFIs’ ROA leads to a 0.63% increase of average loan size. Since 
a larger Average Loan Size indicates less poverty outreach, an increase in profitability is related 
to a decrease in poverty outreach, which causes ‘mission drift’. The interaction term Islamic 
MFI*ROA is negatively and significantly related to Average Loan Size at the 5% level. This 
result also indicates that the negative relation between ROA and poverty outreach is less 
obvious for Islamic MFIs. These two results confirm our hypothesis H4 that compared with 






5.5 Robustness Checks 
The unbalanced sample, where the number of conventional MFIs is almost ten times of 
that of Islamic MFIs, might drive our results. To address the potential concern of selection bias, 
we use propensity score matching (PSM) method. This method could help us reject the 
competing explanation that our results spuriously reflect other different characteristics between 
Islamic MFIs and conventional MFIs, such as leverage and deposits-to-assets, rather than ones 
that we attempt to investigate, such as ROA and OSS. Specifically, using a one-to-one 
matching method without replacement, for each of the 35 Islamic MFIs, we select one 
conventional MFI that is closest to it according to observable characteristics (all control 
variables). In particular, for each hypothesis, the matching MFI selected is the conventional 
MFI with the closest propensity score, estimated from a linear regression of Islamic MFI on all 
control variables used in the corresponding specification5. This procedure results in a matched 
sample of 70 MFIs, where the treatment and control groups are overall statistically indifferent 
based on MFI characteristics. We rerun our main regressions using these matched samples in 
Table 5. We obtain similar results across all specifications. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
6 Conclusion 
 It is hard for conventional MFIs to penetrate into regions with a substantial Muslim 
population because they are incompatible with the financial principles in Sharia (Islamic law), 
(Karim, Tarazi, and Reille, 2008). The high demand for loans highlights the need to provide 
religiously compatible products to the underserved Muslim poor, resulting in the advent of 
Islamic microfinance as a new market niche (Karim, Tarazi, and Reille, 2008). However, little 
is known about the actual performance or outcome of Islamic MFIs, which is the central focus 
of this paper. We expect that the Sharia-compliance characteristics play a role in mitigating 
the information asymmetry between Islamic MFIs and their borrowers due to the role of 
religiosity and the special product design. According to this hypothesis, we should expect that 
Islamic MFIs are less profitable and financially self-sufficient, have lower credit risk, have 
better poverty outreach and are less likely to have ‘mission drift’, than conventional MFIs. 
Employing a sample of microfinance institutions from three regions in the world for the period 
                                                 
5 For instance, for hypothesis one (H1), the control variables used to calculate propensity score are those reported 
in Table 2.  
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1998 to 2014, we find empirical evidence to support these predictions. Our results hold when 
we use PSM method. 
Our study sheds light on extant literature from two perspectives. First, our research adds 
to the limited empirical literature on the role of Islamic finance in the economy and comparative 
literature between conventional and Islamic finance. Second, our research extends and 
complements the current literature on microfinance. In response to Mersland, D’Espallier, and 
Supphellen (2013)’s call for microfinance research that take religions into consideration, our 
research is the first study that investigates the impact of Islam on microfinance. This paper 
helps both practitioners and investors to gain a comprehensive understanding of the difference 
between conventional and Islamic MFIs. This study also has policy implications for 
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This table displays descriptive statistics for all the variables of the total of 316 MFIs during the period of 1998 to 2014. Conventional MFIs are the subsample of 281 MFIs that only provide traditional 
financial products and services, and Islamic MFIs are the subsample of 35 MFIs that fully or partly provide Islamic financial products and services. All variables are explained in Section 4.2 and their 
formal definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
 All MFIs  Conventional MFIs  Islamic MFIs   
Variables Mean SD N  Mean SD N  Mean SD N  Mean Difference 
Key Variable 
Islamic MFI 0.125 0.382 1945           
Dependent Variables 
Operational Costs (%) 15.734 11.042 1495  15.347 10.844 1260  17.809 11.587 235  2.382*** 
Administrative Costs (%) 6.474 5.232 1495  6.385 5.115 1260  6.955 5.736 235  0.570 
ROA (%) -0.341 16.141 1945  0.084 14.731 1702  -3.316 18.002 243  -3.400*** 
OSS (%) 113.935 51.832 1945  112.532 53.845 1702  123.767 42.752 243  11.235 
PaR>90days (%) 4.879 8.432 1945  4.782 9.423 1702  5.556 4.856 243  0.774 
Write-off Ratio (%) 1.692 6.723 1945  1.712 7.312 1702  1.555 5.387 243  -0.157 
Loan Loss Rate (%) 1.691 4.112 1945  1.713 4.214 1702  1.538 2.945 243  -0.175 
Ln (Number of Active 
Borrowers) 7.930 49.285 1945  9.019 50.456 1702  0.305 1.659 243  -8.714 
Average Loan Size 1.457 0.531 1945  1.582 0.548 1702  0.585 0.050  243  -0.997 
Control Variables 
Ln(Total Assets) 15.454 2.125 1945  15.508 2.227 1702  15.073 1.859 243  -0.435*** 
Age_Mature 0.636 0.485 1945  0.658 0.474 1702  0.478 0.500 243  -0.180*** 
Age_New 0.167 0.402 1945  0.155 0.362 1702  0.252 0.435 243  0.097* 
Leverage (%) 443.517 7518.932 1945  435.322 7786.849 1702  500.918 6704.084 243  65.596*** 
Total Assets Growth (%) 300.000 5104.928 1945  336.637 5748.606 1702  45.064 79.234 243  -291.573 
Portfolio Yield (%) 28.578 12.643 1945  28.676 10.274 1702  27.889 14.234 243  -0.787 
Deposits-to-Assets (%) 24.794 31.628 1945  23.517 31.694 1702  33.740 31.038 243  10.223* 
Target Market_Low End 0.332 0.470 1945  0.338 0.473 1702  0.286 0.413 243  -0.052 
Target Market_High End 0.055 0.224 1945  0.053 0.223 1702  0.068 0.252 243  0.015 
Target Market_Small 
Business 0.049 0.217 1945  0.050 0.217 1702  0.041 0.199 243  -0.008 
For Regulated 0.665 0.465 1945  0.689 0.463 1702  0.500 0.501 243  -0.450*** 
For Profit 0.428 0.491 1945  0.437 0.496 1702  0.362 0.478 243  -0.075* 
Disclosure Ratings 2.592 1.414 1945  2.594 1.367 1702  2.581 1.443 243  -0.013*** 












This table reports panel regression results of financial performance on Islamic MFIs in the sample period 1998 to 2014. For dependent 
variables, Operational Costs are the operational costs divided by the gross loan portfolio. Administrative Costs are the total administrative 
costs on the loan portfolio divided by the total assets. ROA is the ratio of net operating income to total assets. Operating Self-Sufficiency 
(OSS) is defined as total financial revenue divided by the sum of financial expense, operating expense and loan loss provision expense. The 
independent variable Islamic MFI is a dummy variable which equals one if an MFI is Islamic, and 0 if it is conventional. Definitions of all 
variables are shown in Appendix A. In all columns, country-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent Variables Operational Costs   Administrative Costs  ROA 
 OSS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Islamic MFI 0.093***  0.016**  -0.037***  -0.098*** 
 (2.71)  (1.96)  (-2.63)  (-2.84) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.521***  0.481***  0.025**  0.030 
 (10.57)  (11.57)  (2.56)  (0.84) 
Age_Mature -0.226***  -0.151***  -0.001  -0.072 
 (-7.79)  (-4.64)  (-0.24)  (-1.39) 
Age_New 0.058  0.084*  -0.046***  -0.037*** 
 (1.43)  (1.71)  (-5.24)  (-4.14) 
Leverage -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (-1.18)  (-0.66)  (-0.13)  (-0.47) 
Total Assets Growth 0.000  0.001***  0.000  0.000 
 (1.11)  (8.97)  (1.39)  (-1.21) 
Portfolio Yield 0.123***  0.102***  0.147***  0.425*** 
 (3.67)  (3.12)  (3.20)  (2.91) 
Deposits-to-Assets 0.060  0.046  -0.005  -0.002 
 (1.38)  (0.90)  (-0.54)  (-0.25) 
Write-off Ratio 1.622***  0.802***  -0.226**  -1.300*** 
 (4.11)  (3.01)  (-2.29)  (-3.02) 
Target Market_Low End 0.004  0.005***  -0.011***  0.006 
 (1.05)  (2.58)  (-3.19)  (1.56) 
Target Market_High End -0.008  -0.003  0.001  -0.006 
 (-1.40)  (-1.13)  (0.12)  (1.12) 
Target Market_Small Business -0.025***  -0.000  -0.021***  -0.099** 
 (-3.37)  (-0.07)  (-2.59)  (-2.18) 
For Regulated 0.082***  0.142**  0.051**  -0.002  
(3.00)  (1.98)  (2.34)  (-0.78) 
For Profit -0.035  -0.090*  -0.004  -0.004 
 (-0.92)  (-1.95)  (-0.58)  (-0.82) 
Disclosure Ratings 0.061***  0.033***  -0.003  -0.002 
 (6.19)  (2.68)  (-1.56)  (-1.34) 
Ln(Number of Offices) -0.007  -0.012  0.006*  0.003 
 (-0.40)  (-0.61)  (1.91)  (1.05) 
Constant -0.863*  -1.008***  -0.120***  -0.293*** 
 (-1.86)  (-4.17)  (-3.09)  (-7.15) 
        
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1495  1495  1945  1945 





This table reports panel regression results of credit risk on Islamic MFIs in the sample period 1998 to 2014. For dependent variables, 
PaR>90days is the percentage of the portfolio that is overdue for more than 90 days. Write-off Ratio is the percentage of the total amount 
of loans written off to gross loan portfolio. Loan Loss Rate is the ratio of the difference between write-offs and loans recovered to gross 
loan portfolio. The independent variable Islamic MFI is a dummy variable which equals one if an MFI is Islamic, and 0 if it is conventional. 
Definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix A. In all columns, country-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variables PaR>90days  Write-off Ratio  Loan Loss Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Islamic MFI -0.017**  -0.002**  -0.005** 
 (-2.04)  (-1.97)  (-2.06) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.004  0.037*  0.007** 
 (-0.74)  (1.79)  (2.03) 
Age_Mature -0.001  0.000  0.002 
 (-0.23)  (0.09)  (0.79) 
Age_New 0.013*  -0.013***  0.005 
 (1.76)  (-3.06)  (1.40) 
Leverage 0.000  -0.000  0.000*** 
 (1.57)  (-0.56)  (3.17) 
Total Assets Growth 0.000  0.000**  0.000*** 
 (0.84)  (2.27)  (3.17) 
Portfolio Yield -0.004  -0.015  0.009 
 (-0.32)  (-0.78)  (1.05) 
Deposits-to-Assets 0.054***  0.007  -0.008** 
 (5.44)  (1.36)  (-2.28) 
ROA 0.006  -0.072***  -0.001 
 (0.22)  (-3.58)  (-0.12) 
Target Market_Low End -0.000  0.000  -0.294 
 (-0.04)  (0.01)  (-1.03) 
Target Market_High End -0.006  0.011  0.216 
 (-0.81)  (0.78)  (0.48) 
Target Market_Small Business  -0.019***  -0.001  -0.100 
 (-3.56)  (-0.29)  (-0.52) 
For Regulated 0.007  0.005  0.011*** 
 (0.59)  (1.27)  (2.91) 
For Profit 0.008  -0.001  0.006** 
 (1.51)  (-0.54)  (2.12) 
Disclosure Ratings -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
 (-0.73)  (0.88)  (1.12) 
Ln (Number of Offices) 0.008***  -0.001  -0.001 
 (2.82)  (-0.81)  (-0.23) 
Constant 0.080***  0.053**  -0.006 
 (3.12)  (2.18)  (-0.42) 
      
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1945  1945  1945 





Social Performance: Outreach and Mission Drift 
In this table, Columns (1) to (2) present panel regression results of poverty outreach on Islamic MFIs, and Columns (3) and (4) report panel 
regression results of mission drift on Islamic MFIs in the sample period 1998 to 2014. For dependent variables, Number of Active Borrowers 
reflects the total number of individuals that an MFI serves. Average Loan Size is the average loan size per borrower divided by country 
group national income per capita. The independent variable Islamic MFI is a dummy variable which equals one if an MFI is Islamic, and 0 
if it is conventional. The interaction term Islamic MFI*ROA represents the effect of the Islamic MFI’s ROA on poverty outreach, namely 
mission drift. Definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix A. In all columns, country-fixed and year-fixed effects are further 
controlled. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent Variables Ln(Number of Active Borrowers)  Average Loan Size 
 Ln(Number of 
Active Borrowers)  Average Loan Size 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dummy_Islamic MFI 0.191***  -0.368***  0.202***  -0.066*** 
 (2.87)  (-2.96)  (2.83)  (-2.98) 
Dummy_Islamic MFIs*ROA     0.568***  -0.086** 
     (3.28)  (-2.43) 
ROA -0.609*  0.056**  -0.748**  0.631** 
 (-1.85)  (2.11)  (-2.18)  (2.14) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.801**  0.151***  0.800***  0.151*** 
 (-4.53)  (8.26)  (-4.58)  (8.26) 
Age_Mature 0.072  0.007  0.075  0.006 
 (1.36)  (1.08)  (1.42)  (0.93) 
Age_New -0.152**  0.210**  -0.148**  0.207** 
 (-2.30)  (2.52)  (-2.23)  (2.49) 
Leverage 0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (0.17)  (-1.52)  (0.11)  (-0.96) 
Total Assets Growth -0.001***  -0.000  -0.001***  -0.000 
 (3.81)  (-0.61)  (3.54)  (-0.41) 
Portfolio Yield -0.010  -0.026***  0.041  -0.032*** 
 (-0.04)  (-2.87) _ (0.14)  (-3.90) 
Deposits-to-Assets 0.053  -0.007  0.048  -0.005 
 (0.75)  (-1.47)  (0.67)  (-1.23) 
Write-off Ratio 0.347  -0.047  0.313  -0.038 
 (1.11)  (-1.09)  (1.01)  (-0.92) 
Target Market_Low End 0.098*  -0.046  0.096*  -0.044 
 (1.79)  (-1.25)  (1.75)  (-1.21) 
Target Market_High End -0.178*  0.077  -0.179*  0.076 
 (-1.70)  (0.71)  (-1.71)  (0.70) 
Target Market_Small Business 0.085  0.077  0.078  0.084 
 (0.62)  (0.66)  (0.57)  (0.72) 
For Regulated -0.003  0.008**  -0.003  0.008** 
 (-1.25)  (2.23)  (-1.21)  (2.28) 
For Profit 0.063  -0.130**  0.063  -0.130** 
 (1.22)  (-2.17)  (1.21)  (-2.04) 
Disclosure Ratings 0.114***  -0.127***  0.113***  -0.126*** 
 (7.12)  (-6.26)  (7.05)  (-6.23) 
Ln(Number of Offices) -0.047*  2.790  -0.047*  2.644 
 (-1.93)  (1.35)  (-1.93)  (1.28) 
Constant -3.543***  -0.732***  -3.528***  -0.702*** 
 (-11.42)  (2.90)  (-11.37)  (2.76) 
        
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1945  1945  1945  1945 





Financial Performance, Credit Risk and Social Performance: Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Analyses 
This table reports panel regression results of financial performance, credit risk and social performance on Islamic MFIs when using samples 
obtained from propensity score matching. Panel A presents results using financial performance measures: Operational Costs, Administrative 
Costs, ROA and OSS. Panel B presents results using credit risk measures: PaR>90days, Write-off Ratio and Loan Loss Rate. Panel C presents 
results using social performance measures: Ln(Number of Active Borrowers) and Average Loan Size. Definitions of all variables are shown 
in Appendix A. In all columns, country-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Financial Performance 
Dependent Variables Operational Costs   Administrative Costs  ROA 
 OSS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Islamic MFI 0.052**  0.026**  -0.042**  -0.082*** 
 (2.11)  (2.03)  (-2.45)  (-2.96) 
        
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 470  470  486  486 
adj. R2 0.368  0.264  0.358  0.221 
Panel B: Credit Risk        
Dependent Variables PaR>90days  Write-off Ratio  Loan Loss Rate   
 (1)  (2)  (3)   
Islamic MFI -0.021**  -0.004*  -0.005*   
 (-2.12)  (-1.84)  (-1.81)   
    _    
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes   
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes   
N 486  486  486   
adj. R2 0.498  0.335  0.422   
Panel C: Social Performance        
Dependent Variables Ln(Number of Active Borrowers)  Average Loan Size 
 Ln(Number of 
Active Borrowers)  Average Loan Size 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dummy_Islamic MFI 0.191***  -0.368***  0.187***  -0.064*** 
 (3.25)  (-3.57)  (3.14)  (-3.25) 
Dummy_Islamic MFIs*ROA     0.428***  -0.076*** 
     (3.85)  (-2.84) 
ROA     -0.637**  0.547** 
     (-2.25)  (2.18) 
        
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 486  486  486  486 














Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Operational Costs The operational costs divided by the gross loan portfolio, which mainly covers wages and 
administrative costs 
Administrative Costs The total administrative costs on the loan portfolio divided by the total assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) The ratio of net operating income to total assets 
Operating Self-Sufficiency (OSS) Total financial revenue divided by the sum of financial expense, operating expense and 
loan loss provision expense 
PaR>90days The percentage of the portfolio that is overdue for more than 90 days 
Write-off Ratio The percentage of the total amount of loans written off to gross loan portfolio Write off is 
an accounting procedure that removes the outstanding balance of loans from the items of 
Gross Loan Portfolio and Impairment Loss Allowance when these loans are recognised as 
uncollectable 
Loan Loss Rate The ratio of the difference between write-offs and loans recovered to gross loan portfolio  
Number of Active Borrowers The natural logarithm of the total number of individuals that an MFI serves 
Average Loan Size The average loan size per borrower divided by country group national income per capita 
Explanatory Variable  
Islamic MFI A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI is Islamic, and 0 if it is conventional 
Control Variables  
Total Assets The natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage The ratio of total debt over total equity 
Total Assets Growth  The ratio of the difference of current year total assets and the previous year total assets 
divided by the previous year total assets.  
Portfolio Yield The interest revenue divided by gross loan portfolio for conventional MFIs; the mark-up 
and dividend divided by gross loan portfolio for Islamic MFIs. Mark-up is the fixed income 
of Marabaha (Islamic microfinance product).  
Deposits-to-Assets The ratio of total deposits divided by total assets 
Age_Mature A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI is mature 
Age_New A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI is new 
Target Market_Low End A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI targets low-end markets 
Target Market_High End A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI targets high-end markets 
Target Market_Small Business A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI targets small business markets 
For Regulated A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI is regulated; zero if it is not regulated 
For Profit A dummy variable equal to one if an MFI is profit-oriented 
Disclosure Ratings Disclosure quality ratings by the MIX Market database. One indicates the lowest 
disclosure quality and five indicates the highest disclosure quality  

















Regulatory support for Islamic MFIs 
Country Regulation 
Afghanistan In 2015, Afghanistan’s new banking law formalizes basic regulations that govern (micro)banks’ ability to offer 
Sharia-compliant services (Russel, 2016).  
Bangladesh The Bangladesh government signs the Charter of Islamic Development Bank in 1974, in which it commits itself 
to reorganize its financial system as per Islamic Sharia. Under the government poverty-alleviation promotion, 
Islamic Bank Bangladesh Limited launches the Rural Development Scheme” by adopting Islamic microfinance 
products through a community development approach (Jahan, 2012). 
Egypt In 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood government, along with the Egyptian Islamic Finance Association, makes 
Islamic finance and microfinance as one central part of its economic policy aiming at turning 35% of the total 
financial market into Islamic by 2017 (Girona, Aghina, and Boundaoui, 2014).  
Indonesia In 1994, the Indonesia government places microfinance (both conventional and Islamic) as a vital component in 
its poverty alleviation strategies and programmes. Following the government’s Islamic Banking Act of 2008, 
Bank Indonesia (the central bank) launches the dual (micro)finance system: conventional and Islamic ones 
(Kustin, 2015). 
Pakistan In the early 2000s, the State Bank of Pakistan (the central bank) has formulated guidelines for provisions of 
Islamic microfinance produces and services. These guidelines aim to enhance the scope of microfinance services 
and products consistent with Sharia principles, and to specify the four types of institutions eligible in providing 
Islamic microfinance (Kustin, 2015).  
Sudan In the early 2000s, the Sudan government transforms the existing dual economic system into Islamic financial 
system. This reform has enahnced Islamic financial infrastructures and provided a favorable environment for 
Islamic microfinance. In 2006, Central Bank of Sudan takes the initiative of formulating a vision for developing 
and expanding microfinance sector in Sudan (Ahmed and Ammar, 2015). 
Yemen In 1997, the Yemen government and the United Nations establishes the Hodeidah Microfinance Program, which 







The Distribution of Conventional and Islamic MFIs in Each Country 
Country Number of conventional MFIs Number of Islamic MFIs Percentage of Islamic MFIs 
Afghanistan 15 3 16.67% 
Bangladesh 79 2 2.47% 
Indonesia 69 5 6.76% 
Iraq 8 4 30.33% 
Jordan 6 2 25.00% 
Kosovo 11 1 8.33% 
Kyrgyzstan 45 1 2.17% 
Lebanon 5 1 16.67% 
Pakistan 31 5 13.89% 
Palestine 5 6 54.55% 
Syria 2 1 33.33% 











MFI Name and Location 




FINCA - AFG Afghanistan 
Al Majmoua Lebanon 
Azal Yemen 




MBK Ventura Indonesia 
ACAD Palestine 
ASALA Palestine 






BMT Pringsewu Indonesia 
Abyan Yemen 
FINCA - JOR Jordan 
Reef Palestine 
BMT Pelita Insa Indonesia 
BMT Kayu Manis Indonesia 
CHF Iraq Iraq 
CWCD Pakistan 
Al Aman Iraq 
Al Amal Bank Yemen 
Farz Foundation Pakistan 
Al Takadum Iraq 
BMT Sanama Indonesia 
Mutahid Afghanistan 
Muslim Aid Bangladesh 
Islamic Relief Palestine 
IIFC Group Afghanistan 
 
